Plaza Accord

Plaza Accord

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The 1985 "Plaza Accord" is named after New York City's Plaza Hotel, which was the location of a meeting of finance ministers who reached an agreement about managing the fluctuating value of the US dollar. From left are Gerhard Stoltenberg of West Germany, Pierre Bérégovoy of France, James A. Baker III of the United States, Nigel Lawson of Britain, and Noboru Takeshita of Japan.

Foreign exchange
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Historical agreements
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v t e

The Plaza Accord was a joint-agreement between France, West Germany, Japan, the United States, and the United Kingdom, to depreciate the U.S. dollar in relation to the Japanese yen and German Deutsche Mark by intervening in currency markets. The five governments signed the accord on September 22, 1985, at the Plaza Hotel in New York City. The U.S. dollar depreciated significantly since the agreement until it was replaced by the Louvre Accord in 1987.^[1][2][3]

Contents

• 1Background
• 2Effects
• 3See also
• 4References
• 5External links

Background[edit]

Between 1980 and 1985 the dollar had appreciated by about 50% against the Japanese yen, Deutsche Mark, French Franc and British pound, the currencies of the next four biggest economies at the time.^[4] This caused considerable difficulties for American industry but at first their lobbying was largely ignored by government. The financial sector was able to profit from the rising dollar, and a depreciation would have run counter to Ronald Reagan's administration's plans for bringing down inflation. A broad alliance of manufacturers, service providers, and farmers responded by running an increasingly high-profile campaign asking for protection against foreign competition.

Major players included grain exporters, car producers, engineering companies like Caterpillar Inc., as well as high-tech companies including IBM and Motorola. By 1985, their campaign had acquired sufficient traction for Congress to begin considering passing protectionist laws. The prospect of trade restrictions spurred the White House to begin the negotiations that led to the Plaza Accord.^[5][6]

The justification for the dollar's devaluation was twofold: to reduce the U.S. current account deficit, which had reached 3.5% of the GDP, and to help the U.S. economy to emerge from a serious recession that began in the early 1980s. The U.S. Federal Reserve System under Paul Volcker had halted the stagflation crisis of the 1970s by raising interest rates, but this resulted in the dollar becoming overvalued to the extent that it made industry in the U.S. (particularly the automobile industry) less competitive in the global market.

Effects[edit]

Devaluing the dollar made U.S. exports cheaper to purchase for its trading partners, which in turn allegedly meant that other countries would buy more American-made goods and services.

The exchange rate value of the dollar versus the yen declined by 51% from 1985 to 1987. Most of this devaluation was due to the $10 billion spent by the participating central banks.^{[citation needed]} Currency speculation caused the dollar to continue its fall after the end of coordinated interventions. Unlike some similar financial crises, such as the Mexican and the Argentine financial crises of 1994 and 2001 respectively, this devaluation was planned, done in an orderly, pre-announced manner and did not lead to financial panic in the world markets. The Plaza Accord was successful in reducing the U.S. trade deficit with Western European nations but largely failed to fulfill its primary objective of alleviating the trade deficit with Japan. This deficit was due to structural conditions that were insensitive to monetary policy, specifically trade conditions. The manufactured goods of the United States became more competitive in the exports market but were still largely unable to succeed in the Japanese domestic market due to Japan's structural restrictions on imports. The Louvre Accord was signed in 1987 to halt the continuing decline of the U.S. dollar.

The signing of the Plaza Accord was significant in that it reflected Japan's emergence as a real player in managing the international monetary system. However, the recessionary effects of the strengthened yen in Japan's export-dependent economy created an incentive for the expansionary monetary policies that led to the Japanese asset price bubble of the late 1980s.^[7] It is thus postulated^[8] that Plaza Accord contributed to the Japanese asset price bubble, which progressed into a protracted period of deflation and low growth in Japan known as the Lost Decade.

See also[edit]

• Currency war
• Endaka
• Dodge Line, yen to dollar equalization efforts March 7, 1949
• Post-war economic boom
• Lost Decade (Japan)
• Toshiba-Kongsberg scandal

References[edit]

1. ^ Margaret Thatcher Foundation. "Full Text Archive of the Plaza Agreement by Margaret Thatcher Foundation". www.margaretthatcher.org. Archived from the original on 2018-12-03. Retrieved 2018-12-03.
2. ^ "Full Text Archive of Plaza Accord by University of Toronto". www.g8.utoronto.ca. Archived from the original on |archive-url= requires |archive-date= (help). Retrieved 2018-12-03.
3. ^ Funabashi, Yōichi (1989). Managing the Dollar: From the Plaza to the Louvre. Peterson Institute. pp. 261–271. ISBN 9780881320978.
4. ^ Brook, A, F Sedillot and P Ollivaud (2004). "Channel 1: Exchange Rate Adjustment". OECD Economics Working Paper 390 - "Channels for Narrowing the US Current Account Deficit and Implications for Other Economies" (online ed.). Oxford; New York: OECD. p. 8, figure 3. doi:10.1787/263550547141.CS1 maint: Multiple names: authors list (link)
5. ^ Michael J. Hiscox (2005). "The Domestic Sources of Foreign Economic Policies". In John Ravenhill (ed.). Global Political Economy (First ed.). Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press. p. 65. ISBN 0-19-926584-4. OCLC 60383498.
6. ^ I. M. Destler; C. Randall Henning (1993). Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States. Institute for International Economics. pp. 105–130. ISBN 0-19-926584-4.
7. ^ World Insight: Lessons on Trade Deals. Yasuo Fukuda, former Prime-Minister of Japan. CGTN: "China raises tariffs in response to U.S. measures / Lessons on Japan-U.S. trade deal in the 1980s" on YouTube, Interview with CGTN host. / May 2019, minutes 28:23–32:29.
8. ^ "China seeks to learn from mistakes of 1985 Plaza Accord". The Japan Times. 9 September 2006. Retrieved 27 September 2011.

External links[edit]

• Announcement the Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors of France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States (Plaza Accord)
• U.S. Treasury - Exchange Stabilization Fund, Intervention Operations 1985-90 at the Wayback Machine (archived 2010-11-12)
• Plaza Agreement, ANZ Financial Dictionary from Language of Money by Edna Carew at the Wayback Machine (archived 2009-02-23)
• Reverse Plaza Accord

Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Plaza_Accord&oldid=903179000"

Categories:

• Foreign exchange market
• 1985 in economics
• 1985 in Japan
• Economy of West Germany
• Economic history of Japan
• Economic history of the United States
• Group of Seven
• International macroeconomics
• Treaties concluded in 1985
• Treaties of Japan
• Treaties of France
• Treaties of the United Kingdom
• Treaties of the United States
• Treaties of West Germany
• United States–Asian relations
• United States–European relations